In this paper, we consider discrete-time dynamic games of the mean-field type with a finite number, N , of agents subject to an infinite-horizon discounted-cost optimality criterion. The state space of each agent is a locally compact Polish space. At each time, the agents are coupled through the empirical distribution of their states, which affects both the agents' individual costs and their state transition probabilities. We introduce the solution concept of Markov-Nash equilibrium, under which a policy is player-by-player optimal in the class of all Markov policies. Under mild assumptions, we demonstrate the existence of a mean-field equilibrium in the infinite-population limit, N → ∞, and then show that the policy obtained from the mean-field equilibrium is approximately Markov-Nash when the number of agents N is sufficiently large.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mean-field game theory has been developed independently by Huang, Malhamé, and Caines [1] and Lasry and Lions [2] to study continuous-time non-cooperative differential games with a large number of identical agents. The key underlying idea is that, under a particular equilibrium condition, called the Nash certainty equivalence principle [1] , the decentralized game problem can be reduced to a single-agent decision problem. This principle essentially says that the state evolution of an individual agent should be consistent with the total population behavior.
The optimal solution of this single-agent decision problem, with the consistency property, provides an approximate Nash equilibrium for the corresponding game with large (but finite) population sizes. However, in contrast to the standard single-agent optimal control problem, the characterization of this optimal solution in the continuous-time setting leads to a Fokker-Planck equation evolving forward in time, and a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation evolving backward in time. We refer the reader to [3] - [9] for studies of continuoustime mean-field games with different models and cost functions, such as games with major-minor players, risk-sensitive games, and LQG games.
By contrast, there are relatively few results on discretetime mean-field games. Existing works have mostly studied the setup where the state space is discrete (finite or countable) and the agents are coupled only through their cost functions; that is, the mean-field term does not affect the evolution of the states of the agents. Gomes et al. [10] study a discretetime mean-field game with a finite state space over a finite horizon. Adlakha et al. [11] consider a discrete-time meanfield game where the state space is a countable subset of a d-dimensional lattice, under an infinite-horizon discounted cost criterion. This setup is the closest to the one studied here. However, in addition to the state space being at most countable, Adlakha et al. [11] also assume that, for each agent, every stationary policy induces a Markov chain that has at least one invariant distribution. In this case, the optimal control problem in the mean-field limit corresponds to a standard homogeneous Markov decision problem. Biswas [12] considers the average-cost setting, where the state space is a σ-compact Polish space and the transition probability of an individual agent does not depend on the empirical distribution of the states. Under the regularity conditions imposed in [12] , it can be shown that, for each stationary policy, the corresponding Markov process for each agent has a unique invariant measure, which is a standard technique when studying average-cost problems. However, these regularity conditions are stated in terms of a specific metric topology on the set of stationary policies, and appear to be too strong to hold under reasonable assumptions. Discretetime mean-field games with linear individual dynamics are studied in [13] - [15] .
In this paper, we consider discrete-time mean-field games with a Polish state space, under the infinite-horizon discounted-cost optimality criterion. In such a game, the agents are coupled through the empirical distribution of their states at each time, which affects both the individual costs and the state transition probabilities of each agent. In Section II, we formulate the finite-agent discrete-time game problem of the mean-field type and introduce the solution concept of Markov-Nash equilibrium, under which a policy is player-by-player optimal in the class of all Markov policies. In Section III, we introduce the infinite-population meanfield game and prove the existence of a mean-field equilibrium, which we use in Section IV to deduce the existence of an approximate Markov-Nash equilibrium for N -agent games when N is sufficiently large. Some of the proofs are omitted due to space limitations. Section V lists some directions for future research. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first result demonstrating the existence of an (exact or approximate) equilibrium policy for a discrete-time meanfield game with finitely many agents.
Due to space limitations, proofs of most of the results have not been included; they can be found in the full version [16] of the paper.
Notation. For a metric space E, we let C b (E) denote the set of all bounded continuous real functions on E. For any u ∈ C b (E), we let u := sup e∈E |u(e)| which turns C b (E) into a Banach space. Let P(E) denote the set of all Borel probability measures on E. For any E-valued random element x, L(x)( · ) ∈ P(E) denotes the distribution of x. For any ν ∈ P(E) and measurable real function g on E, we define ν(g) := gdν. Unless otherwise specified, the term "measurable" will refer to Borel measurability.
II. FINITE PLAYER GAME WITH DISCOUNTED COST
We consider a discrete-time N -agent stochastic game with a Polish state space X and a Polish action space A. The dynamics of the game are specified by an initial state distribution µ 0 ∈ P(X) and a stochastic state transition kernel p : X × A × P(X) → P(X) as follows. For every t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} and every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N }, let x N i (t) ∈ X and a N i (t) ∈ A denote respectively the state and the action of Agent i at time t, and let
denote the empirical distribution of the state configuration at time t, where δ x ∈ P(X) is the Dirac measure at x. The initial states x N i (0) are independent and identically distributed according to µ 0 , and, for each t ≥ 0, the nextstate configuration (x N 1 (t + 1), . . . , x N N (t + 1)) is generated at random according to the probability law
where p(·|x, a, µ) denotes the image of the triple (x, a, µ) ∈ X × A × P(X) in P(X) under the state transition kernel p.
To complete the description of the game dynamics, we must specify how the agents select their actions at each time step. To that end, we introduce the history spaces H 0 = X × P(X) and H t = (X × A × P(X)) t × (X × P(X)) for t = 1, 2, . . ., all endowed with product Borel σ-algebras. 1 A policy for a generic agent is a sequence π = {π t } of stochastic kernels on A given H t ; we say that such a policy is Markov if each π t is a Markov kernel on A given X. The set of all policies for Agent i is denoted by Π i , and the subset consisting of all Markov policies by M i . Furthermore, we let M c i denote the set of all Markov policies for Agent i that are weakly continuous; that is, π = {π t } ∈ M c i if for all t ≥ 0, π t : X → P(A) is continuous when P(A) is endowed with the weak topology.
Let
We let π (N ) := (π 1 , . . . , π N ), π i ∈ Π i denote the N -tuple of policies for all the agents in the game. We will refer to π (N ) ∈ Π (N ) simply as a 'policy.' Under such a policy, the action configuration at each time t ≥ 0 is generated at random according to the probability law
where
) for t ≥ 1 are the histories observed by Agent i at each time step. The stochastic update rules in Eqs. (1) and (2), together with the initial state distribution µ 0 , uniquely determine the probability law of all the states and actions for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N } and all t ≥ 0. We will denote expectations with respect to this probability law by E π (N ) · .
We now turn to the question of optimality. The one-stage cost function for a generic agent is a measurable function c : X × A × P(X) → [0, ∞). For Agent i, the infinite-horizon discounted cost under the initial distribution µ 0 and a policy π (N ) ∈ Π (N ) is given by
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. The standard notion of optimality is a player-by-player one:
There are two challenges pertaining to Nash equilibria in the class of games considered here. The first challenge is the (almost) decentralized nature of the information structure of the problem. Namely, the agents have access only to their local state information x N i (t) and the empirical distribution of the states e (N ) t , and there is no general theory (of existence and characterization of Nash equilibria) for such games even with special structures for the transition probabilities. The second difficulty arises because of the so-called curse of dimensionality; that is, the solution of the problem becomes intractable when the number of states/actions and agents is large. The existence of Nash equilibria in this case is a challenging problem even when the agents have access to full [17] - [19] and references therein). Therefore, it is of interest to find an approximate decentralized equilibrium with reduced complexity. To that end, we introduce the following solution concept:
for each i = 1, . . . , N , and an ε-Markov-Nash equilibrium (for a given ε > 0) if
Remark 1. It is possible to show that, when the cost function c is bounded (i.e., c < ∞), there is no loss of generality in restricting the infima in Def. 2 to weakly continuous Markov policies. We omit the proof due to space limitations.
The main contribution of this paper is the proof of existence of ε-Markov-Nash equilibria for games with sufficiently many agents. To this end, we first consider a meanfield game that arises in the infinite-population limit N → ∞ and prove the existence of an appropriately defined meanfield equilibrium for this limiting mean-field game. Then we pass return back to the finite-N case and show that, if each agent in the original game adopts the mean-field equilibrium policy, then the resulting policy constitutes an approximate Markov-Nash equilibrium for all sufficiently large N .
III. MEAN-FIELD GAMES AND MEAN-FIELD EQUILIBRIA
We begin by considering a mean-field game that can be interpreted as the infinite-population limit N → ∞ of the game introduced in the preceding section. This mean-field game is specified by the quintuple X, A, p, c, µ 0 , where, as before, X and A denote the state and action spaces, respectively, p( · |x, a, µ) is the transition probability, and c is the one-stage cost function. We also define the history spaces as G 0 = X and G t = (X × A) t × X for t = 1, 2, . . ., which are endowed with their product Borel σ-algebras. A policy is a sequence π = {π t } of stochastic kernels on A given G t . The set of all policies is denoted by Π. A Markov policy is a sequence π = {π t } of stochastic kernels on A given X. The set of Markov policies is denoted by M. Remark 2. It is important to note that mean-field games are not games in the strict sense. As it will be shown below, they are single-agent stochastic control problems with a constraint on the distribution of the state at each time step.
Instead of N agents in the original game, here we have a single agent and model the collective behavior of (a large population of) other agents by an exogenous state-measure flow µ := (µ t ) t≥0 ⊂ P(X) with a given initial condition µ 0 . We say that a policy π * ∈ Π is optimal for µ if
is the infinite-horizon discounted cost of policy π with the measure flow µ. Here, the evolution of the states and actions is given by
where g(t) ∈ G t is the state-action history up to time t.
Let M := µ ∈ P(X) ∞ : µ 0 is fixed be the set of all state-measure flows with a given initial condition µ 0 . Define the set-valued mapping Φ : M → 2 Π as Φ(µ) = {π ∈ Π : π is optimal for µ}. Conversely, we define a mapping Λ : Π → M as follows: given π ∈ Π, the state-measure flow µ := Λ(π) is constructed recursively as
where P π (da(t)|x(t)) denotes the conditional distribution of a(t) given x(t) under π and (µ τ ) 0≤τ ≤t . The following structural result shows that the restriction to Markov policies entails no loss of optimality: Proposition 1. For any state measure flow µ ∈ M, we have
Furthermore, we have Λ(Π) = Λ(M); that is, for any π ∈ Π, there existsπ ∈ M such that µ π t = µπ t for all t ≥ 0. In other words, we can restrict ourselves to Markov policies in the definitions of Φ and Λ without any loss of generality -that is, we have Φ(M) ⊂ 2 M and Λ(M) = M. We are now in a position to introduce the notion of an equilibrium for the mean-field game:
The main result of this section is the existence of a meanfield equilibrium under the following assumptions on the components of the model: 
(e) The initial probability measure µ 0 satisfies X w(x)µ 0 (dx) =: M < ∞.
Theorem 1. Under Assumption 1, the mean-field game (X, A, p, c, µ 0 ) admits a mean-field equilibrium (π, ν).
Proof of Theorem 1
We
u ≤ c 1−β }, and equip it with the following metric:
where σ > 0 is chosen so that σβ < 1. For any ν ∈ P(X × A), we let ν 1 denote the marginal of ν on X; that is, ν 1 ( · ) := ν( · × A). For any ν ∈ P(X × A) ∞ and t ≥ 0, we define the operator T ν t : C β (X) → C β (X) as
c(x, a, ν t,1 ) + β X u(y)p(dy|x, a, ν t,1 ) . 2 Recall that the set of probability measures is always equipped with the topology of weak convergence in this paper.
Next, let us define the operator T ν : C → C as
Note that T ν t is a contraction on C β (X) with modulus β for all t ≥ 0, i.e.,
. From this, it can be shown that T ν is a contraction on C with modulus σβ:
Since (C, ρ) is a complete metric space, T ν has a unique fixed point by the Banach fixed point theorem.
For any ν ∈ P(X × A) ∞ , we let J ν * ,t denote the value function at time t of the nonhomogeneous Markov decision process with the one-stage cost functions c(·, ·, ν t,1 ) t≥0 and the transition probabilities p( · |x, a, ν t,1 ) t≥0 . Let J ν * := J ν * ,t t≥0 . To prove the existence of a mean-field equilibrium, we adopt the technique of Jovanovic and Rosenthal [21] . Define the set-valued mapping Γ : ) and B(ν)
We say that ν ∈ P(X×A) ∞ is a fixed point of Γ if ν ∈ Γ(ν).
The following proposition makes the connection between mean-field equilibria and the fixed points of Γ: Proposition 2. Suppose that Γ has a fixed point ν = (ν t ) t≥0 . Construct a Markov policy π = (π t ) t≥0 by disintegrating each ν t as ν t (dx, da) = ν t,1 (dx)π t (da|x), and let ν 1 = (ν t,1 ) t≥0 . Then the pair (π, ν 1 ) is a mean-field equilibrium.
By Proposition 2, it suffices to prove that Γ has a fixed point in order to establish the existence of a mean-field equilibrium. To that end, we will use Kakutani's fixed point theorem [22, Corollary 17.55 ]. For each t ≥ 0, let us define the following set:
Since w is a continuous moment function, the set P t (X) is compact with respect to the weak topology [20, Proposition E.8, p. 187 ]. Let us define
Since A is compact, P t (X×A) is tight. Furthermore, P t (X× A) is closed with respect to the weak topology. Hence, P t (X × A) is compact. Let Ξ := ∞ t=0 P t (X × A) which is convex and compact with respect to the product topology. Proposition 3. For any ν ∈ Ξ, we have Γ(ν) ⊂ Ξ.
By Proposition 3, the restriction of Γ to Ξ is a set-valued mapping into 2 Ξ . Thus, we aim to prove that Γ has a fixed point ν ∈ Ξ. First, note that it can be proved in the same way as in [21, Theorem 1] that C(ν) ∩ B(ν) = ∅ for any ν ∈ Ξ. Furthermore, we can show that both C(ν) and B(ν) are convex, and thus their intersection is also convex. Note that Ξ is a convex compact subset of a locally convex topological space M(X × A) ∞ , where M(X × A) denotes the set of all finite signed measures on X × A. The final piece we need in order to deduce the existence of a fixed point of Γ by an appeal to Kakutani's fixed point theorem is the following: Proposition 4. The graph of Γ, i.e., the set
is closed.
IV. EXISTENCE OF APPROXIMATE MARKOV-NASH EQUILIBRIA
Now we are in a position to prove the main result of the paper -namely, the existence of an approximate Markov-Nash equilibrium in games with sufficiently many agents. Let (π, µ) denote the mean-field equilibrium, which exists by Theorem 1. In a nutshell, the proof boils down to showing that, if each of the N agents adopts the meanfield equilibrium policy π, then the resulting policy π (N ) = {π, π, . . . , π} is an ε-Markov-Nash equilibrium for all sufficiently large N .
In addition to Assumption 1, we impose an additional smoothness condition on the state transition probabilities and on the one-stage cost function. To this end, let d denote any metric on P(X) that metrizes the weak topology, and define the following moduli of continuity: The following theorem is the main result of the paper: Theorem 2. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, for any ε > 0, there exists a positive integer N (ε), such that, for each N ≥ N (ε), the policy π (N ) = {π, π, . . . , π} is an ε-Markov-Nash equilibrium for the game with N agents.
The remainder of this section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 2. In a nutshell, the logic of the proof can be described as follows: We first show that, as N → ∞, the empirical distribution of the agents' states at each time t converges to a deterministic limit given by the mean-field equilibrium distribution of the state at time t. This allows us to deduce that the evolution of the state of a generic agent closely tracks the equilibrium state-measure flow in the infinite-population limit. We then show that the infinitepopulation limit is insensitive to individual-agent deviations from the mean-field equilibrium policy.
We start by defining a sequence of stochastic kernels P π t ( · |x, µ) t≥0 on X given X × P(X) as
For each N ≥ 1, let x N i (t) 1≤i≤N denote the state configuration at time t in the N -person game under the policy π (N ) , and let e (N ) t denote the corresponding empirical distribution. The following proposition states that, at each time t, the sequence of random measures e (N ) t converges to the mean-field equilibrium distribution µ t of the state at time t as N → ∞:
Proposition 5. For all t ≥ 0, L(e (N ) t ) → δ µt weakly in P(P(X)), as N → ∞.
From the above proposition and from the assumed continuity of the transition probability p( · |x, a, µ) in µ, we can deduce that the evolution of the state of a generic agent in the original game with sufficiently many agents should closely track the evolution of the state in the mean-field game: Proposition 6. If (π, µ) is a mean-field equilibrium, then , π, . . . , π} (i.e., when Agents 2 through N stick to the mean-field equilibrium policy π, while Agent 1 deviates withπ (N ) ), and letẽ (N ) t denote the corresponding empirical distribution. The following result states that, in the infinitepopulation limit, the law of the empirical distribution of the states at each time t is insensitive to local deviations from the mean-field equilibrium policy:
For each N ≥ 1, let {x N (t)} t≥0 denote the states of the non-homogenous Markov chain that evolves as follows:
t,µt ( · |x N (t)). 
Note that
for any bounded sequence {T N } ⊂ C b (X × P(X)), such that the family T N (x, · ) : x ∈ X, N ≥ 1) is equicontinuous.
For any sequence {g N } N ≥1 ⊂ C b (X) with sup N ≥1 g N =: L < ∞ and for any t ≥ 0, let us define
For any x ∈ X and (µ, ν) ∈ P(X) 2 , we have
Since ω p (r) → 0 as r → 0 by Assumption 2-(a), the family {l N,t (x, · ) : x ∈ X, N ≥ 1} is equicontinuous. Using this observation, we now prove the following result.
Therefore, by Lemma 1, for any t ≥ 0, we have
for any sequence {T N } ⊂ C b (X × P(X)) such that the family T N (x, · ) : x ∈ X, N ≥ 1) is equicontinuous and sup N ≥1 T N < ∞.
Proof. We prove the result by induction on t. The claim trivially holds for t = 0 as L(x N 1 (0)) = L(x N (0)) = µ 0 for all N ≥ 1. Suppose the claim holds for t and consider t + 1. We can write
Since the family {l N,t } N ≥1 satisfies the hypothesis of Lemma 1, the last term converges to zero as N → ∞. This completes the proof.
Recall that we have (π (N ) , π, . . . , π) − J µ (π (N ) ) = 0.
Proof. Fix any t ≥ 0 and define
Note that, for any x ∈ X and for any (µ, ν) ∈ P(X) 2 ,
≤ ω c (d(µ, ν) ).
Since ω c (r) → 0 as r → 0, the family T N,t (x, · ) : x ∈ X, N ≥ 1 is equicontinuous. Moreover, sup N ≥1 T N,t < ∞. Therefore, by Proposition 8, we have
for all t ≥ 0. Then the theorem follows from the dominated convergence theorem. Now we are ready to prove the main result of the paper:
Proof of Theorem 2. For sufficiently large N , we need to prove that
for each i = 1, . . . , N . Since the transition probabilities and the one-stage cost functions are the same for all agents, it is sufficient to prove (5) for Agent 1 only. Given > 0, for each N ≥ 1, letπ (N ) ∈ M c 1 be such that J (N ) 1 (π (N ) , π, . . . , π) < inf π ∈M c 1 J (N ) 1 (π , π, . . . , π) + ε 3 .
Then, by Proposition 6 and Theorem 3, we have (π, π, . . . , π), which completes the proof.
V. CONCLUSION
We have investigated Markov-Nash equilibria for discretetime mean-field games with finitely many players under the infinite-horizon discounted cost optimality criterion. In a nutshell, a Markov-Nash equilibrium policy is player-by-player optimal in the class of all Markov policies. Using the meanfield approach, we have demonstrated the existence of an approximate Markov-Nash equilibrium for finite-population games with bounded costs when the number of agents is sufficiently large.
We are currently investigating extensions of our results to games with imperfect information. In this case, one possible approach is to use the theory developed for partially observed Markov decision processes (MDPs). Finally, average-cost and risk-sensitive optimality criteria are also worth studying.
In particular, using the vanishing discount approach in MDP theory (i.e., β → 1), we may be able to establish similar results for the average cost case.
